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ABSTRACT This article analyses the emergence of labour camps in the CCP base area
of Shandong province from 1942 to 1950. By using original archival material, it
provides a detailed understanding of the concrete workings of the penal system in a
specific region, thus giving flesh and bone to the more general story of the prison in
China. It also shows that in response to military instability, organizational problems
and scarce resources, the local CCP in Shandong abandoned the idea of using prisons
(jiansuo) to confine convicts much earlier than the Yan’an authorities, moving
towards a system of mobile labour teams and camps dispersed throughout the
countryside which displayed many of the key hallmarks of the post-1949 laogai.
Local authorities continued to place faith in a penal philosophy of reformation
(ganhua) which was shared by nationalists and communists, but shifted the moral
space where reformation should be carried out from the prison to the labour camp,
thus introducing a major break in the history of confinement in 20th-century China.
Scholarship on the history of the laogai – or reform through labour camps
– in the People’s Republic of China is generally based either on an
analysis of official documents or on information gathered from former
prisoners.1 The major difficulty encountered in research on the laogai is
the lack of more substantial empirical evidence, as internal documents
and archives produced by prison administrations, public security bureaus
or other security departments have so far remained beyond the reach of
historians.2 A similar difficulty characterizes research on the history of
crime and punishment in CCP-controlled areas before 1949. Patricia
Griffin’s remarkable book on the communist treatment of counter-revolu-
tionaries from 1924 to 1949 relied mainly on documents seized by the
Kuomintang in campaigns against the communists in the 1930s.3 Her
book included a pioneering chapter on prison management, which was
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based predominantly on a 1946 report from the Taihang Administrative
Office.4 Although her work was published almost a quarter of a century
ago, more recent publications from mainland China have continued to
rely on similar evidence, thus patching together a small number of official
reports from very different regions and periods to reconstruct a penal
history which is heavily centred on the base area around Yan’an.5 The
official reports and newspaper items used by historians, moreover, tend to
be more normative than descriptive: they may reflect official prison
policy in Yan’an but provide precious little evidence on actual penal
practices. This research report, in contrast, is based on archival material
pertaining directly to penal administration in Shandong from 1942 to
1950.6 The use of original source material enables a much more detailed
understanding of the concrete workings of labour camps in a specific
region, thus giving flesh and bone to the more general story of the prison
in China and providing a first building block towards a more nuanced and
authoritative history of the laogai in the PRC.
On the basis of fresh evidence, moreover, it is argued that penal policy
in Shandong evolved primarily in response to military instability, local
constraints and practical problems: direct references to penal ideas and
practices from the Soviet Union only appeared at the end of the 1940s.
The pragmatic policies pursued by judicial authorities in Shandong
reflected a broader shift of the local party towards the concentration of
human resources and organizational structures in a decade marked by
war.7 Contrary to Yan’an, the base area in Shandong was blockaded,
invaded and in some places conquered by the Japanese (1941–42) or the
Kuomintang (1946–47). As a consequence of these rapidly shifting
military situations, no fixed spaces of confinement divided into cells and
referred to as “prisons” (jiansuo or jianyu) in both communist areas and
nationalist territory appeared in the Shandong base area: instead, highly
mobile “instruction teams” (xunyudui) during the war were followed by
relatively independent “penal education camps” (jiaoyusuo) or “education
through labour camps” (laojiaosuo) dispersed in small teams throughout
4. She initially published this chapter as an article; see Patricia Griffin, “Prison
management in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods,” The China Quarterly, No. 58 (June 1974),
pp. 310–331.
5. Zhang Xipo and Han Yanlong, Zhongguo geming fazhi shi (The History of the
Revolutionary Law System in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987).
6. I have used the Shandong Provincial Archives, Jinan, series C23, which encompass the
quanzong G1 to G52 of the “revolutionary period”; I also consulted a collection of selected
archives published by the local party and available in the Shandong Provincial Archives
(Shandong geming lishi ziliao xuanbian (Jinan: Shandong sheng dang’anguan, 1980–87),
hereafter SDLS), as well as judicial periodicals and handbooks from the region preserved in
the archives of the Investigation Bureau, Taipei. Shandong province was divided into several
gongshu, which I translate as “districts,” which in turn were divided into zhuanshu, or
“sub-districts,” the next administrative unit being the xian, or “county.”
7. This shift in policy has been analysed by Elise Anne DeVido, “The making of the
communist party-state in Shandong province, 1927–1952,” Harvard University, PhD thesis,
1995, a useful study which relies on published PRC documents; see also Elise Anne DeVido,
“Wartime mobilisation in the Shandong base area,” in Feng Chongyi and David S.G.
Goodman (eds.), North China at War, 1937–1945: The Social Ecology of Revolution (New
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
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the countryside. The local CCP in Shandong thus abandoned the prison
much earlier than the Yan’an authorities, moving towards a system of
labour camps which displayed many of the key hallmarks of the post-
1949 laogai, based on “reform through labour” in economically self-
sufficient camps. They continued to place faith in a penal philosophy of
repentance and reformation (ganhua) which first appeared during the late
Qing and was shared by nationalists and communists, but shifted the
moral space where reformation should be carried out from the prison to
the labour camp, introducing a major break in the history of confinement
in 20th-century China.8
From Instruction Teams to Labour Camps
The custodial sentence only appeared in China after the abolishment of
traditional penalties, including corporal punishment, during the first dec-
ade of the 20th century. As the custodial sentence became the most
common form of punishment, the number of prisons drastically increased
in order to accommodate a rising tide of inmates. During the republican
period (1911–1949), county magistrates, city mayors, provincial gover-
nors and central governments, with varying degrees of success, pursued
an extensive programme of prison building in line with modern penal
principles current in Europe. Modernizing elites viewed the reformation
of criminals as an integral part of a much larger project of national
regeneration in which social cohesion, economic development and state
power could only be obtained by moulding obedient subjects. Based on
the idea of reformation, the custodial sentence was, on the one hand, part
of a global movement towards penal reform and, on the other, a local
reconfiguration of a more traditional faith in the transformative capacity
of education. In resonance with the Mencian view of human nature as
inherently good and extremely malleable, the notion of reformation
sustained the belief that criminals could achieve individual self-improve-
ment with proper institutional guidance.9
The prison was also adopted by the CCP, who replicated to a very large
extent the penal philosophy of reformation through education as well as
the more general penal terminology created by the prison reformers since
the late Qing. The primary function of prisons during the Jiangxi Soviet
(1924–33), however, was the incapacitation of political enemies, although
poor security and inadequate sanitation subverted even this relatively
straightforward goal from the very start. Scarce resources also limited the
scope of imprisonment, and prisons were gradually forced to take on a
productive purpose: the high costs of incarceration, it was thought, could
be reduced by putting prisoners to work. As a result of the United Front
policy during the Yan’an period (1934–44), the emphasis was finally
shifted towards the reformative function of prisons: education should be
8. On reformation (ganhua) and the prison in modern China, see Frank Diko¨tter, Crime,
Punishment and the Prison in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
9. A comparison of communist prisons with the Kuomintang prison system is clearly
beyond the scope of this article, although a detailed study of the latter can be found in ibid.
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primary and punishment secondary, as prisoners should be “reformed”
(zixin) to become disciplined members of a communist society. In line
with these new policies, all sentenced criminals had to spend time in
detention centres (kanshousuo) or prisons (jiansuo) where they would
have the opportunity to reform through labour: true repentance would
lead to early release, while the sentence of the obstinate prisoner could be
increased. After 1941, a number of border areas and administrative areas
thus established prisons to house convicted felons, although reports on
their management show that new penal policies were not implemented
until 1944 and 1945, as sanitary conditions and the health of prisoners
continued to be neglected in many places.10
Prisons, however, did not play a major part in the penal practices
pursued in Shandong before 1949. More detailed evidence from the base
area of that province shows that beating, cursing and corruption were
rampant in spaces of confinement in the early 1940s, in particular as the
base camps suffered from sustained mop-up operations by the Japanese in
1941 and 1942: as tens of thousands of troops were thrown at the
communists, an already frail penal sector fell into further disarray. In
February 1942, Li Yu, a key figure in the Shandong base area, com-
plained that judicial departments confused civil and criminal cases, did
not distinguish between light and heavy offences, indiscriminately used
confinement and fettered or shackled prisoners without due reason, while
guards humiliated and randomly insulted or beat convicts, thus impeding
the goal of reformation, denying the spirit of the law and contravening
their human rights. He recommended that suspects for light offences be
released on bail while convicted prisoners should not be fettered, with the
exception of violent, escape-prone or suicidal ones; education, rather than
punishment, should be stressed.11
As the war with Japan progressed, however, local authorities were
confronted with a growing number of prisoners. Harsh penalties imposed
on a variety of common crimes further caused the prison population to
swell: in 1943, for instance, temporary regulations imposed long prison
sentences and the death penalty to manufacturers, planters, transporters
and traders of opium and narcotic products.12 Similarly severe penalties
were promulgated the same month for the abduction of women.13 In the
absence of reliable sources on this early period, it may be speculated that
the local authorities lacked the necessary training and adequate resources
10. Griffin, The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counterrevolutionaries, pp. 109–116.
11. “Shandong sheng zhanshi gongzuo tuixing weiyuanhui guanyu lixing baoshi jianshao
jiya renfan yu gaishan fanren daiyu de xunling” (“Orders concerning the use of bail, the
reduction in confinement and the improvement in the treatment of prisoners by the Shandong
Wartime Work Promotion Committee”), SDLS, August 1942, Vol. 8, pp. 474–75.
12. “Shandong sheng jinyan zhizui zanxing tiaoli” (“Shandong province temporary
regulations on the prohibition of opium”), 2 April 1943, SDLS, Vol. 9, pp. 423–24;
“Shandong sheng jindu zhizui zanxing tiaoli” (“Shandong province temporary regulations on
the prohibition of narcotics”), 2 April 1943, SDLS, Vol. 9, pp. 424–25.
13. “Shandong sheng zhangonghui duiyu zhizhi qiangjie guafu de xunling” (“Order on the
suppression of female abduction in Shandong province”), April 1943, SDLS, Vol. 9,
pp. 458–59.
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to cope with a large prison population: mass executions of serious cases
and early release of light offenders could alleviate the pressure on scarce
prison facilities. In October 1944, for instance, directives were issued to
“strenuously avoid” the confinement of criminals, given the “practical
constraints” under which judicial departments had to operate: fines or
other “methods of reformation” (ganhua fangfa) were to be considered as
more viable alternatives.14 Two months later, at the Shandong Second
Administrative Conference in December 1944, several shortcomings in
judicial administration were noticed, including the random killing of
suspects and the indiscriminate use of imprisonment and torture in a
number of counties. It was proposed that these practices be radically
eliminated, the principal task of guards in detention houses being the
education of prisoners.15
As confinement seemed to generate a whole series of problems which
judicial authorities were unable to contain, the use of prisoners in labour
teams in the countryside offered an appealing alternative. The case of
Rongcheng county, in Jiaodong, was notable, as prisoners were employed
on a farm to reclaim wasteland. In the wake of this experiment, the
Jiaodong authorities decided to establish “penal instruction teams” (tu-
xing fanren xunyudui) for prisoners throughout the district, which roughly
covered the peninsula to the east of the province: political prisoners who
could not be entrusted to their villages were to be reformed through
labour in these teams.16 Cao Manzhi observed that the practice of sending
convicted criminals back to perform hard labour in their own village
(huicun laoyi) had been useful in times of guerilla warfare, but had led to
an increasingly lax attitude which undermined the need to reform prison-
ers (gaizao fanren) and had alienated the local villagers who did not
comprehend why criminals were treated leniently. Since May 1944,
several counties had successfully experimented with instruction teams: as
the liberated areas were under the firm control of the party, the concen-
tration (jizhong) of prisoners no longer presented major obstacles and the
use of instruction teams was to be expanded in order to reform the rising
numbers of prisoners of war. Teams were established at the county level
under the control of judicial departments (sifake), 11 to 12 prisoners
forming a small team (xiaodui), three teams constituting a squad (fendui).
Each team selected a leader who should have a positive attitude towards
work and be ideologically reliable; a cook was also chosen from each
team. Female prisoners were sent to local factories when their numbers
were insufficient to form a team. Convicted prisoners who had not yet
completed a sentence of at least one year which could not properly be
14. “Xiuzheng gaijin sifa gongzuo gangyao” (“Essentials of revisions and improvements
in judicial work”), 10 October 1944, SDLS, Vol. 13, pp. 75–76.
15. “Shandong sheng di’erci xingzheng huiyi sifa zuzhi zongjie baogao” (“Summary
report on judicial organization by the Shandong Province Second Administrative Confer-
ence”), December 1944, SDLS, Vol. 13, pp. 316–334.
16. “Shandong sheng di’erci xingzheng huiyi sifa zuzhi zongjie baogao” (“Summary
report on judicial organization by the Shandong Province Second Administrative Confer-
ence”), December 1944, SDLS, Vol. 13, pp. 316–334.
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carried out in their villages should be assembled and incorporated into the
instruction teams, where ideological reform and productive labour should
be equally emphasized. Three to five hours a day should be spent on
education, political reform being essential but “cultural education” (wen-
hua jiaoyu) also being considered important. Model prisoners (mofan de
fanren) should be selected, and incentives such as parole or reduced
sentences were to nudge prisoners towards full reform. Initially, the costs
of the instruction teams were carried by the government, although
prisoners were enjoined to become economically self-sufficient as soon as
possible. They had to provide their own clothes, shoes and blankets,
except in cases of hardship, such as when families had cut off all links
with the convicts. After Japan surrendered in the summer of 1945, the
Jiaodong authorities decided to expand the use of these teams further in
order to cope with increasing numbers of prisoners of war.17
Similar developments also characterized other districts in the Shandong
base area. In the Binhai district, encompassing the coastal region south of
Qingdao, social instability caused by war led local cadres to neglect the
education of prisoners, and some counties like Zouping were unable to
provide armed guards, while others maltreated male prisoners and abused
women in custody. Despite these practical constraints on the use of
confinement, the prison population swelled in the wake of the CCP’s
military expansion. In 1945, the region detained an estimated 1,876
prisoners, who lived in conditions described as “intolerably odious” (elie
bukan); 277 escaped, including 23 from Zouping county.18 The dispersed
(fensan) nature of penal policy was blamed for poor security, dismal
sanitary conditions and frequent abuse, and the Binhai authorities ordered
that counties establish detention houses (kanshousuo) for suspects await-
ing trial, and education camps (jiaoyusuo) for convicted criminals: by
concentrating existing resources, better education and labour facilities
could be provided for the prisoners.19
The use of instruction teams was embraced by the provincial authori-
ties, who recommended in the spring of 1946 that prisoners be sent to
work as small groups (xiaozu) in the villages under the supervision of the
local militia. They were required to build small prison cells and achieve
economic self-sufficiency by their labour.20 Efforts to build up a new
penal structure on the basis of instruction teams, however, were severely
disrupted by Kuomintang attacks on the base area in the spring of 1947,
leading to the disbandment or destruction of numerous camps, some even
releasing their prisoners.21 Moreover, two years after the instruction
17. G31/1/694/14, “Shandong sheng Jiaodong qu xingzheng gongshu guanyu chengli
jianquan tuxingfan xunyudui de zhishi” (“Instructions on setting up a healthy education team
for prisoners in the Jiaodong district”), 31 October 1945.
18. Bohai sifa gongzuo tongxun (News on Judicial Work in Bohai) (Bohai: Bohai xingshu
yin, 1945), p. 12.
19. G38/1/297/5, “Binhai xingshu guanyu gaizao laojiao fanren gei Jiaonan gong’anju
xunling” (“Order to the Jiaonan public security by the Binhai district regarding the reformation
of prisoners”), 25 October 1949.
20. Sifa huibian (Judicial Compendium), Shandong, August 1946, p. 13.
21 G4/1/155/2, “Tuxing fanren jiaoyu jigou tongyi shezhi yijian” (“Views on the unified
establishment of labour camps”), 1948.
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teams were set up in Jiaodong, an investigation showed that lack of
proper supervision by an insufficient number of trained cadres accounted
for the poor achievements of the prisoners. It was noted that prisoners
came from a variety of social backgrounds and that the teaching methods
did not address their particular needs. Work was too dispersed and needed
to be concentrated (jizhong) in order to become more effective. Once
again, concrete problems pointed towards a greater concentration of
prisoners, as large camps were seen to be better equipped to heighten
productivity and improve education.22
A vision of large labour camps which would operate in economic
self-sufficiency in the countryside was also shaped by a lenient policy
towards political prisoners and the conquest of large areas formerly under
Kuomintang control. Li Yu, head of the Shandong provincial govern-
ment, stated that serious traitors, collaborators, saboteurs, spies and
bandits should be executed, but local leaders and reactionary landlords
should be allowed “to perform meritorious services to atone for their
crimes” (ligong shuzui) if they wished to repent fully and renew them-
selves (huiguo zixin).23 The use of mass executions against political
enemies combined with the lenient treatment of light offenders is illus-
trated in an official history of the Shandong base area, which estimated
that over 5,000 counter-revolutionary bandits had infiltrated the region by
the end of 1948; the following year, over 2,000 were “exterminated,”
nearly a thousand were arrested and 1,670 were registered for having
expressed “repentance” (huiguo), which presumably meant a term in a
labour camp.24
As large territories formerly under Kuomintang control fell to the CCP,
the sheer number of political prisoners forced judicial authorities to
abandon instruction teams and develop penal education camps (fanren
jiaoyusuo). Each district should run one or more camps, which took into
custody long-term prisoners from counties under their jurisdiction. Simi-
lar camps were established at the county level for prisoners on short
sentences. Moreover, prisoners who had been allowed to return to their
villages (huicun) should be investigated and the recalcitrant ones reincar-
cerated for the rest of their sentences. Penal education centres were
requested to collaborate with local militias and army units to guard the
prisoners, and were instructed to use old or abandoned sites such as
temples or factories. The food and clothing was provided on the basis of
economic self-sufficiency, labour having both educational and productive
purposes. Prisoners could be used by local authorities to participate in
public works such as road maintenance or dyke construction. They were
divided into small groups (xiaozu) with an elected head who was respon-
sible for study (xuexi) and production (shengchan). The principle of
22. G31/1/703/41, “Zenyang gaijin xunyu gongzuo” (“How to improve instruction work”),
1947.
23. “Shandong sheng zhengfu bugao” (“Notice of the Shandong provincial government”),
February 1947, SDLS, Vol. 18, pp. 300–301.
24. Shandong sheng lijie zhengfu shizheng (The Administration of all Previous
Governments in Shandong Province), pp. 205 and 220.
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lesser eligibility was used, as the treatment of prisoners should be slightly
below the living standards of ordinary workers, although they should be
appropriately fed and clothed. The existing skills of prisoners should be
deployed, and they had to contribute to the local economy rather than
work independently. The revenue generated from prison labour was used
to maintain the camps, although a small fraction could be used as a bonus
(fenhong) to be saved for the prisoner on leaving the camp. A system of
rewards and punishments was adopted, including reduction of sentence
(jianxing) and parole (jiashi), in order to encourage repentance.25 The
next section looks in greater detail at the workings of labour camps.
The Organisation of Labour Camp
Precious little evidence is available about the exact size of the prison
population under communist control before 1949. Archival material,
however, shows that in the Shandong base area over 11,000 individuals
were held in custody in May and June 1949, not including several
thousand “professional thieves” from the big cities. Jiaodong and
Luzhongnan districts each had a camp for 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners, while
places like Zibo and Qingdao had camps for 1,000. Petty thieves from the
cities were sent to the Bohai camp.26 More detailed breakdowns indicate
the relative importance of different categories of prisoners, showing that
common prisoners were as important as the political ones. In Binhai, for
instance, Public Security forces in nine counties held 447 prisoners in
custody in September 1949, leading to a total of 3,640 prisoners handled
by the police since the beginning of the year. The latest batch of prisoners
included 186 “suspects” (xianyi), 35 “landlord troops” (huanxiangtuan),
seven individuals who had violated police regulations (weijing), 51
thieves and bandits (daofei), 69 murderers, and three traitors (pantu); the
majority were sentenced to hard labour in camps.27
While archival material from labour camps cannot form the basis of a
systematic analysis of sentencing policies, they nevertheless provide
impressionistic evidence about prison terms. The local party in the
Shandong base area adopted a policy of leniency in 1948–49, as the
majority of prisoners were condemned to terms of less than three years.
In Taishan, for instance, the camp had 59 prisoners condemned to one
year, 119 to between one and three years, 51 to between three and five
years, and 37 to between five and ten years.28 Details of roughly 200
prisoners in the camp in Yimeng, Luzhongnan district, were listed in a
special chart, providing their names, sex, age, social status (chushen
25. “Tuxing fanren jiaoyu jigou tongyi shezhi yijian” (“Suggestions about the unification
of the labour camp structure”), 1948, SDLS, Vol. 21, pp. 517–520.
26. G4/1/299/16, “Shandong sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu banli laojiao de zhishi” (“The
people’s government of Shandong province issues orders related to the administration of
labour camps”), 1949.
27. G10/1/269/1, “Binhai zhuanqu gong’anju gexian jiya fanren shijian tongjibiao”
(“Statistics on prisoners held in custody in various counties of the Binhai district by the Public
Security Bureau”), 30 September 1949.
28. G38/1/324/10, “Taishan zhuanshu jiaoyusuo jiu yuefen gongzuo huibao” (“Report for
September from the education camp of the Taishan sub-district”), 15 December 1949.
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chengfen), type of crime, length of sentence, start and end of sentence,
and special comments. Only half were KMT supporters, including spies
(sentenced to between three and five years) and heads of defence units
(two to five years), while common prisoners included landlords (12
years), murderers (seven to eight years) and petty thieves (one year). Liu
Naigui, for instance, was classified as a “middle peasant”: he had
purposefully injured himself (zishang) and was given six months, while
Feng Baozhen, a landlord, was a thief sentenced to ten years. The
majority of prisoners were sentenced to between one and three years.29
On the other hand, a short sentence was not necessarily indicative of a
lenient approach, as prisoners could be sent to the front-line to carry out
dangerous work. The Qinghe camp received a total of 1,290 prisoners in
1948, of which 361 were in the camp at the beginning of 1949; no
prisoners were released, as almost 700 were sent to the front-line instead,
the remaining having escaped or died.30
A more detailed account of the organization of labour camps appears
in the archives of the Jiaodong district, where 19 education camps at the
level of the sub-district (zhuanshu), the county (xian) and the city
(Yantai) took care of convicted criminals. Each of the four sub-district
camps had a director, four teachers (one for every 200 prisoners), an
accountant, an administrator, a cook and a liaison man, as well as 24
guards. At the county level, each camp had a director, a secretary and an
administrator, the district boasting a total of 78 cadres in total to look
after more than 2,000 inmates, excluding guards. The “cultural level” of
cadres at the county level was described as very low, not a few being
illiterate and of relatively poor “political quality.” All the camps used
civilian houses or old public structures such as temples and guilds. None
had achieved economic self-sufficiency, as the economic infrastructure
was either inadequate or had been destroyed by Kuomintang advances in
1947, a difficult year followed by famine caused by crop failures. In most
camps prisoners saw their rations diminish from 12 to four ounces, while
40 prisoners from several camps had lacked food for several months. The
district administration agreed to an emergency loan, and in early 1950,
prisoners were back to a ration of 12 ounces a day, made up mainly of
dried sweet potatoes and a few vegetables. Their health suffered as a
consequence of malnutrition, and sick prisoners on short sentences were
allowed to return home as the camps had insufficient medical facilities to
look after them. Others were sent to the local hospital; despite these
measures, some camps reported up to three deaths a month. Clothes,
following regulations, had to be provided by the prisoners themselves.
During the winter of 1949 the central administration provided poor
prisoners without relatives with 78 old jackets, although some inmates in
29. G38/1/329/8, “Erzhuanshu fanren jiaoyusuo shang bannian fanren tongjibiao”
(“Statistics on the education camp in the sub-districts for the past half year”), 8 September
1949.
30. G42/1/249/7, “Qinghe zhuanshu gong’anju laojiaosuo yinian zhi gongzuo qingkuang”
(“The conditions of labour during the last year in the labour camp of the Qinghe sub-district”),
8 January 1949.
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the Nanhai camp were still without cotton-padded clothes in March
1950.31
Hunger and cold also undermined the health of prisoners in other
districts. In a report from the Taishan camp in Luzhongnan, local officials
noted that most of the prisoners suffered from the cold winter, as their
families were either too far away or too poor to send clothes; many
inmates had neither cotton-padded clothes nor shoes. Hunger was wide-
spread in the camp.32 In an account of her imprisonment by the CCP in
the Shandong base area from September 1947 onwards, Marie Ina
Bergeron recalls how she was part of a group of 1,000 prisoners who
were dispersed in small teams of ten to 15 in the countryside. The food
was basic, often based on slices of dough (pianpian) and a bowl of hot
water. When prisoners were made to till the fields, they often used the
opportunity to fill their pockets with weeds like dandelion which were
eaten in the evening, while lucky prisoners caught frogs to supplement
their diet.33 Poor health not only inflated the death rate during periods of
famine: in the eyes of the authorities, sick prisoners hampered production
efforts. By the end of 1949, a special order was passed on disease and
death in labour camps, and advice on the treatment of the sick was
circulated in the hope of curbing death rates. In the Bohai camp alone, 31
prisoners had died in the autumn of 1949, while infectious diseases also
spread unchecked.34
Escape was rarely a viable option. While prisoners were often left
without adequate supervision during the early 1940s, the emerging sys-
tem of labour camps was specifically designed to concentrate human
resources and improve surveillance. In contrast to the early 1940s, few
escapes or riots were reported. The Qinghe camp, for instance, noted that
escapes were initially a security problem, but had ceased since Xue
Changhai had been executed after an unsuccessful escape attempt. With
the arrival of prisoners of war, the camp authorities reported that only
minor acts of “sabotage” (pohuai) had marred the discipline of the camp.
Zhao Lanwei, for instance, had openly defied authority by refusing to
participate in a movement of wartime mobilization: the guards pounced
on him, tied him up and locked him away in an isolation cell.35 In general,
strict rules and tight surveillance from the camp guards and the local
population made escapes extremely difficult, although conditions could
vary considerably from one camp to another: for example, 31 prisoners
out of 301 escaped from the Taishan camp in 1949.36 Every aspect of life
31. G31/1/729/1, “Guanyu jiansuo qingkuang de baogao” (“Report on conditions in
prisons”), March 1950.
32. G38/1/324/10.
33. Marie Ina Bergeron, Lettres a` Yeou-Wen (Paris: Mame, 1973), pp. 59, 75, 84, 108 and
173.
34. G10/1/249/7, “Bohai xingzhengqu gong’anju guanyu jianshao laojiaosuo fanren
bingwang tongling” (“Order from the Public Security Bureau of the Bohai district on the
decrease of disease and death of prisoners in labour camps”), 30 November 1949.
35. G42/1/249/7.
36. G38/1/324/6, “Taishan zhuanshu fanren jiaoyusuo quannian jieshou ji chuli fanren
tongjibiao” (“Yearly statistics on prisoners from the labour camp of the Taishan sub-district”),
15 December 1949.
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was supervised in minute detail, including the use of the toilet at night,
when prisoners had to pass the watchtower and announce in a loud and
clear voice “reporting to visit the latrine.” Five minutes were allowed for
urinating, and no more than seven minutes should be spent on defaecat-
ing. In daytime, prisoners were only to relieve themselves during periods
of rest. Punishment awaited those who dawdled, as ten minutes of rest
was deducted on the first infringement, the entire noon pause the second
time, while grinding work was imposed next. Smoking and making noise
were prohibited in the dormitories, as were private conversations between
inmates.37
Life in the camp was dedicated primarily to labour, which was thought
to have an educative as well as an economic function. Agricultural work
was the principal occupation of prisoners in the Jiaodong district: the
prisoners of the Binbei camp alone reclaimed 800 mu of wasteland and
planted wheat in 1949. In regions lacking uncultivated land, land rental
and substitute cultivation (zugeng daigeng) was used instead. The Binbei
camp also discovered deposits of fluorite minerals which were mined to
support 300 prisoners. Despite these efforts, the famine of 1948 severely
hindered agricultural work and the handicraft industry was pursued as an
alternative, including the manufacture of rope, oil, salt and bricks: in the
Beihai camp, 36 prisoners operated three grinders day and night to polish
rice for the neighbouring farmers, while five inmates produced baskets
and other utensils. A further ten made shoes, and one was assigned to the
manufacture of rope. Half a dozen female inmates operated sowing
machines. Prisoners could also be transferred to work on public utilities:
over 100 inmates thus contributed to the maintenance of the river system,
while 200 were recruited to install telephone cables from Laiyang to
Weifang. The local authorities admitted that “errors” had been committed
in 1948–49 as prisoners were allowed to become involved in commercial
activities: in the camp of Huangxian, for instance, a shop was entirely
operated by inmates, who invested and managed the assets without proper
supervision, an experience which was terminated after several of the
prisoners absconded.38 In the Tai’an camp in Luzhongnan district, 15
prisoners were escorted in cars for a two-week trip to transport salted fish
to Donghai, which made a considerable profit for a camp of just over 300
inmates. Another 16 made bean cakes, while a brick kiln and a textile
factory confirmed the move away from agriculture towards handicraft
industry.39
In the Bohai district, which covered the area along the coast north of
Jinan, the first labour camp was opened in March 1948, local authorities
proclaiming that it should be a hospital, a school and a factory all at once
in order to achieve the goal of reform through education. Organized into
37. G10/1/255/2, “Bohai xingshu laojiaosuo guanjiao fanren gezhong zhidu” (“Various
systems for the supervision of prisoners in the labour camp of the Bohai district”), 8 December
1949.
38. G31/1/729/1.
39. G38/1/324/8, “Shi yuefen gongzuo zongjie baogao” (“Summary report on work during
October”), 18 October 1949.
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four squadrons (zhongdui), prisoners constructed over 200 simple houses
as well as an iron chimney.40 Growing from a mere 500 prisoners to over
1,700 in 1949, the camp had 11 production units (shengchan danwei),
including a power plant, a carpentry, an ironwork factory, a noodle
factory, a textile factory, a vermicelli factory, a brick factory, a cement
factory, an embroidery factory, a factory producing shoes and uniforms,
and a construction unit, contributing over 77,000 items a year. Camp
authorities boasted that 154 different products were fabricated by prison
labour.41 Inmates also made pickles and wotou buns.42 The camp became
economically self-sufficient in 1949, as over 800,000 jin of coarse food
grain were produced, the total assets of the camp being valued at an
equivalent of nearly 2 million jin. Subtracting loans and the cost of
electricity, the camp reported a net yearly profit of almost one million
jin.43
Incentives were used to promote the productivity of prisoners. The
Bohai camp had a system of punishments and rewards which was
designed to take into account five items, namely “achievements in
production” (shengchan chengji), “discipline at work” (laodong jilu¨),
“discipline in behaviour” (xingdong jilu¨), “discipline in studies” (xuexi
jilu¨) and “discipline in hygiene” (weisheng jilu¨). A mark system was used
in which individuals achieving over 100 points were recompensed, while
those below par were punished. The five rewards included removal of
punishments (quxiao chufen), removal of restraining devices (quxiao
xingju), praise (biaoyang), material incentives (wuzhi jiangli) or early
release (jianxing), while punishments ranged from suspension of pauses
between work (tingzhi xiuxi), suspension of visits, a warning (jinggao), a
demerit (jiguo), entering a hard labour team (ru yanggongdui), the use of
restraining devices (dai xingju) and solitary confinement (jinbi) to in-
crease of the sentence (zengxing).44 Exemplary workers could retain 5 per
cent or more of their contribution as a bonus; in the Xihai camp, some
prisoners were able to earn 500–600 yuan a month.45
As Patricia Griffin has underlined, limited resources rather than legal
provisions probably accounted for restraints on the use of long periods of
detention.46 This is further illustrated by the use of early release, which
helped circumvent the problem of shortages and created an incentive for
prisoners to reform. In the Bohai camp, for instance, 1,712 prisoners,
including a mere 27 women, were held by the end of 1949. In its yearly
report, the Bureau of Public Security noted that 566 prisoners had left,
40. G42/1/235/5, “Bohai laojiaosuo diyi zhongdui jilu” (“Record of the first squadron of
the labour camp of Bohai district”).
41. G34/1/500/6, “Bohai gong’anju 1949 nian laojiaosuo gongzuo baogao” (“Report by
the Public Security Bureau of work in the labour camp of Bohai district for 1949”), 1949.
42. G34/1/488/5, “Bohai si zhuanshu fanren jiaoyusuo shengchan tongjibiao” (“Statistics
on products made by prisoners of the education camp of the four sub-districts of Bohai”), 1950.
43. G42/1/235/3, “Bohai laojiaosuo yinianlai de gongzuo jianbao” (“Brief report on labour
in the Bohai camp during the last year”), January 1950.
44. G10/1/255/2.
45. G31/1/729/1.
46. Griffin, The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counterrevolutionaries, pp. 118.
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while 998 had been given a reward, leading to one case of release on
parole and 58 reduced sentences.47 An example was Zhang Wanhe, aged
29 and originally from Ningjin county. A hooligan from poor peasant
origins, he had been convicted to serve a three-year sentence in prison for
dealing in narcotics. He was eager to contribute to production after
entering the labour camp and had enrolled to become a bricklayer.
Despite the spring gales in 1948, he had erected a 70-foot high chimney
for the electricity plant and tirelessly contributed to the project, which
was finished five days ahead of schedule, thus saving a considerable
amount of labour. Twice he obtained a reduction of sentence and had
demonstrated through his work that he had genuinely reformed. Despite
obtaining permission to be released, he refused to leave the camp and
preferred to continue working as a tiler.48
Education was also considered to be paramount by the prison authori-
ties. Regulations in the Bohai camp determined that two to four hours
would be spent on political and cultural education.49 Political readings
could take place several times a day, while group discussions under the
supervision of a guard were organized in the evening. In many cases,
however, the rhetoric of thought reform gave way to the reality of
economic survival, and most camps appear to have stressed productive
activities at the expense of political indoctrination. Reviewing thought
reform in the Jiaodong district camps, Liu Zhulin noted that the educa-
tional achievements of prisoners varied greatly, as camp authorities failed
to address their diverse backgrounds.50 Another report acknowledged that
cadres neglected the education of inmates, as legal departments which
formally supervised the camps were too busy with administrative tasks
and were insufficiently familiar with the needs of the prisoners; most
camps, moreover, were located 20 to 30 li away from these administrative
centres.51 Nevertheless, archival evidence also shows that camp leaders
were keen to use incentives in order to secure greater productivity and
political reliability from prisoners. Leniency, in short, was not only a
policy imposed from above, but a pragmatic tool deployed by cadres in
order to obtain greater motivation from prisoners. In several cases, camp
leaders asked permission to reduce overly harsh sentences imposed
during periods of political purges. In one case, a labour camp detained
two disabled soldiers who had been sentenced to life for indecent
behaviour; their attitude had been appropriate since entering the camp and
it was suggested that their sentence be reduced to a set number of years.
A further nine elderly or handicapped prisoners had been sentenced to
long prison terms in 1943–44, and authorization was requested to rectify
47. G34/1/500/6.
48. Ibid.
49. G34/1/495/9, “Bohai qu laodong jiaoyusuo zuzhi tiaoli” (“Regulations of the labour
camp in Bohai district”), March 1948.
50. G31/1/703/41, “Jiaodong xingshu Liu Zhulin: ‘Zenyang gaijin xunyu gongzuo”’ (“Liu
Zhulin from the Jiaodong district: ‘How to improve educational work”’), 1947.
51. G31/1/729/1.
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the original judgement, as thought reform was difficult to implement
without proper incentives.52
Conclusion
Labour camps emerged in the Shandong base area in response to
military instability, concrete organizational problems and scarce re-
sources. Prisoners were sent back to their villages in the early 1940s to
be controlled by cadres and the “masses,” a practice which was marred
by inadequate supervision and frequent abuse. Instruction teams (xun-
yudui) first appeared in 1944 in efforts to group prisoners and concentrate
scarce resources. With the sudden growth in the number of prisoners after
Japan’s surrender in 1945, these teams gradually developed into labour
camps (laojiaosuo) where the production movement was designed to
remedy the shortage of supplies by promoting economic self-sufficiency.
Labour was also believed to inculcate industrious habits in prisoners and
contribute to thought reform. These camps were relatively small in size
and relied on local facilities, as both economic shortages and military
attacks during the civil war impeded the emergence of more permanent
penal structures. In early 1949, however, some labour camps like the one
in Bohai started developing more elaborate facilities to enhance the
productive efforts of a growing prison population, as threats from the
Kuomintang receded and vast areas came under the control of the CCP.
By the time that news about penal experiments in Manchuria reached
Shandong, labour camps were already a permanent feature of the judicial
system. Central authorities circulated a report by the end of 1949
describing how vice-president Lin Biao had used Soviet advisers in
Manchuria to approve the establishment of several labour teams in the
mines of Gongchangling and Benxi, as existing prisons were incapable of
dealing with a mounting number of prisoners; by this time, however,
large labour camps containing up to 2,000 prisoners each were already
well established in Shandong.53
In contrast to the three provinces in Manchuria, moreover, the CCP in
Shandong had little experience in taking over the large cities in which
most modern prisons were located. After communist forces conquered
Weihaiwei, Qingdao and Jinan, problems appeared as soon as
Kuomintang prisons came under communist control. An investigation of
the prison attached to the Bureau of Public Security in Weihaiwei, for
instance, showed that two teams of 25 guards were all guilty in 1949 of
regularly beating prisoners, some being banged on the head with pipes
before being locked up in an isolation cell. On one occasion, a guard
escorting a suspect to the police bureau became so impatient that he hit
his leg with a rifle; unable to walk, the prisoner was beaten to death with
a hand-grenade. No medical care or suitable food was provided to
52. G42/1/240/2 “Laojiaosuo de gongzuo zongjie” (“Summary report on work in labour
camps”), 1949.
53. G4/1/334/9, Zhongyang renmin zhengfu sifabu, “Guanyu Dongbei yuzheng gongzuo
de xin changshi de jieshao de tongbao” (“Circular introducing new experiments in prison work
from the north-east”), 15 December 1949.
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prisoners, one mentally disturbed woman being allowed to hang herself in
the cell. As the inspector observed, all the guards were soldiers accus-
tomed to the rigours of warfare.54 Similar problems appeared after the
prison in Jinan was taken over: a report in the summer of 1949 showed
that it posed a security threat, as political prisoners were able to act in
collusion to make their confessions tally and information circulated easily
from cell to cell. Several other prisons existed in the city, but all had been
taken over by schools and factories; large numbers of prisoners were sent
instead to the existing labour camps in the countryside, a practice which
would become official policy with the foundation of the People’s Repub-
lic later in 1949.55
54. G40/1/109/18, “Weihai shi gong’anju 1949 nian kanya gongzuo baogao” (“1949 report
on the guarding of detained suspects in the Bureau for Public Security of Weihai city”), 1949.
55. G10/1/193/18, “Guanyu gong’anju yu fayuan de jianyu wenti” (“About the problems
related to the prison of the Public Security Bureau and the local court”), 30 August 1949.
